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C.I.G. _____

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

October 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS--CHINAMemorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

1. The proposed N.I.A. directive in the Appendix hereto was prepared at the suggestion of representatives of the Intelligence Advisory Board at an Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff round table discussion. The appropriate representatives of the I.A.B. submitted their own agencies' suggestions for these requirements, collaborated in their synthesis, and unanimously approved this final draft, with which I fully concur.

2. It is considered that such national intelligence requirements should be approved by the National Intelligence Authority, since the President made this Authority responsible for planning, developing and coordinating the national intelligence program for which these requirements are an indispensable guide.

3. It is therefore recommended that the Intelligence Advisory Board concur in the submittal of the enclosed draft memorandum to the National Intelligence Authority.

HOYT S. VANDENBERG
Lieutenant General, USA
Director of Central Intelligence

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS - CHINA

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence
with the unanimous concurrence of the
Intelligence Advisory Board

1. Attached hereto is proposed N.I.A. Directive, "National Intelligence Requirements - China," which was prepared at the suggestion of representatives of the Intelligence Advisory Board at an Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff round-table discussion. The appropriate representatives of the I.A.B. submitted their own agency suggestions for these requirements and collaborated in their synthesis. This final draft has the unanimous concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board.

2. It is felt that the production of national policy intelligence on any nation or area must be based upon those elements of intelligence which are regarded by the national government as essential to planning for and maintaining the national security and interest in regard to that nation or area. Since these essential elements of intelligence have so direct a relationship to current U. S. policy, a brief statement of U. S. policy for China was required. Pending completion of arrangements to secure such statements of U. S. policy from the State Department, the following brief of U. S. policy in the China area was prepared from ~~the~~ sources State Department [REDACTED] or guidance in the determination and delineation of these essential elements of national intelligence:

a. Overall U. S. policy with respect to China has the following major features. The United States seeks the development of a peaceful, unified and democratic China under

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a National Government comprising all political elements; supports the principle of non-intervention by foreign governments in China's internal affairs; is prepared, under certain conditions, to assist in the rehabilitation of the country and improvement of its agrarian and industrial economy; and encourages the development of foreign trade and private enterprise in China.

1. Non-Intervention. The United States believes the management of China's internal affairs is the responsibility of the Chinese people, and would oppose intervention by any foreign government; it would oppose vigorously any further efforts by foreign nations to split off and control Chinese provinces.

Soviet expansion in the Far East, if it occurs, would threaten world stability, and hinder the realization of U. S. objectives in China. Revival of Japanese and German influence in China may constitute a future threat to U. S. policy objectives in China.

b. Rehabilitation. In economic assistance to China, the United States will give more favorable consideration to projects for the rehabilitation and development of transportation and communication facilities, agriculture, and consumer goods industries than to heavier industries; it will encourage the Chinese Government to approach the problems of internal recovery through international cooperation rather than through nationalistic trade policy and through a tariff policy adapted to China's resources and markets rather than to the development of a self-sufficient economy.

c. Foreign Trade. The United States favors an equality of opportunity among all nations for trade and enterprise in China, extension of the areas of private enterprise whether

~~To: [REDACTED]~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Enclosure

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Chinese or foreign, and assurance of nondiscriminatory treatment of foreign companies and nationals in China and adequate protection of the legitimate rights of property.

3. It is not the intent to publish such statements of policy in directives but merely to employ them for guidance in the research operations necessary to formulate National Intelligence Requirements.

4. C.I.G. proposes to prepare, as soon as practicable, similar National Intelligence Requirements on other areas; Korea and the Middle East having been agreed as the next areas to be covered.

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5. It is recommended that the ~~National Intelligence Authority~~:

a. Approve the attached proposed N.I.A. Directive,

"National Intelligence Requirements - China."

b. Limit distribution of this directive, classified "Top Secret," to the C.I.G. and the intelligence agencies of the I.A.B. in Washington, to those theater or overseas area commanders selected by the War and Navy Departments, and to those chiefs of missions designated by the State Department.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~APPENDIXDRAFTPROPOSED N.I.A. DIRECTIVENATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS--CHINAINTRODUCTION

1. In order to fulfill the National Intelligence Mission as given to the National Intelligence Authority by the President, it is necessary to announce and maintain the essential elements of national intelligence desired, and a list of intelligence requirements from which those essential elements may be produced. These statements as a group will hereafter be known as "National Intelligence Requirements" and will form the broad basis for coordinated directives by all agencies for the production of intelligence.

2. It has been decided initially to evolve the operating procedures and the mechanics of inter-agency coordination necessary to the implementation of National Intelligence Requirements by publishing these requirements for one particular area, i.e., the China area, and basing their contents on that intelligence currently regarded the most essential. For this purpose, these instructions will obtain until circumstances demand their revision. In any event, they will be reviewed quarterly.

Accordingly, the National Intelligence Requirements--China are published herewith in two parts as follows:

Part I - Essential Elements of National Intelligence

Part II - National Intelligence Requirements

3. Upon publication of those National Intelligence Requirements, the Central Intelligence Group will immediately undertake to coordinate the various intelligence directives based thereon and will recommend to the National Intelligence Authority, in three months from

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date of publication, any changes in this directive or in methods and procedures which have been evolved and which should be applied as standing operating procedures for implementing National Intelligence Requirements.

I. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

1. The Essential Elements of National Intelligence consist of that foreign intelligence which is currently essential to the national Government in making sound decisions, developing foreign policy, conducting foreign relations, avoiding surprise, and otherwise planning for and maintaining the national security.

2. The following Essential Elements of National Intelligence for the China area are announced and constitute a directive to the Central Intelligence Group and to the four intelligence agencies who will assist C.I.G. in producing national intelligence on that area.

3. What are the developments in the China area* to show increased activity by the U.S.S.R. to:
 - a. Split off territory from China?
 - b. Support the Chinese Communist Party?
 - c. Secure unilateral political or economic influence in China?
 - d. Discredit U. S. Forces and aims in China?

4. What is the current Nationalist policy as it affects:
 - a. Cessation of hostilities?
 - b. Coalition?
 - c. Foreign relations, particularly with U.S.S.R., U.S.?
 - d. Economic and agrarian development?

* China (including Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang) and Outer Mongolia, and Korea.

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Appendix

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5. What are the capabilities and probable intentions of the Chinese Communist Party in political, economic and military spheres?

II. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

1. The following National Intelligence Requirements are announced as a guide to the intelligence pertaining to the China area which, when met, would fully satisfy the Essential Elements of National Intelligence. These requirements are to be regarded as the basis upon which all phases of intelligence production can be fully coordinated among the appropriate offices of C.I.G. and the intelligence agencies, and in order that all intelligence operations may be properly integrated to produce the desired essential elements.

2. The specific formulations in this section are designed to elicit intelligence which will aid in judging the success of, or threats to, U.S.-China policy in respect to the goals of Chinese peace, unity, democracy and rehabilitation, non-intervention, and foreign trade. Intelligence is desired on the following listed subjects, as individual items, analytic reports, etc., during the three months from date of issue:

a. Trends of policy of the National Government with respect to:

(1) Coalition, the Constitution, structure of government and locus of power, civil liberties, education and labor.

(2) Industrialization including the integration into China proper of Manchurian industry, state control and private enterprise, government finance, agrarian reform, foreign business in China, and Chinese foreign trade.

b. Trends in policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with respect to terms for participation in coalition government, reorganization of their armies and control by the National Government, relinquishment to a coalition government of centralized controls over the administration of Communist-dominated areas.

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- c. Relations between the Chinese Communists and the U.S.S.R., with special emphasis on high-level liaison, or on signs of cleavage between the CCP and U.S.S.R. in policy towards the National Government, contiguous territories, the U. S., and domestic Chinese issues.
- d. Soviet military strength and disposition in China, including Manchuria, and in North Korea, Mongolia and Soviet Siberia, including details of air, ground and naval forces; evidences of stockpiling; construction or improvement in air facilities and construction or improvement in all communications networks.
- e. Soviet military aid to Chinese Communists with details, and evidences of any increase or decrease; information on traffic of military significance between Communist-controlled Shantung, Manchuria, and North Korea, or trans-Mongolian traffic.
- f. Activities of Soviet agencies in Kuomintang and Communist China, and effectiveness of Soviet propaganda in China and classes which are influenced or reached by it.
- g. Current political conditions in Manchuria, with special emphasis on the attitudes of the local peoples toward the Chinese Communists, National Government, other political groups, U.S.S.R., and U.S.A.
- h. Strength, composition, organization and leadership of Chinese minority parties; attitude towards National Government, Communists, U.S.S.R., U.S.A.; freedom of function under National Government.
- i. The development of Chinese industry, particularly iron and steel, shipping, electric power, textiles, petroleum, and light metals.
- j. Crop conditions and food reserves in the areas controlled by the National Government and the Chinese Communists.

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Appendix

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k. Communist military potential, in comparison with that of the National Government, including reserves, equipment, capabilities of both air and ground forces, and ability to provide logistic support.

l. Nationalist military potential, status and efficiency of air, ground and sea forces; ability of industry and arsenals to provide replacements of equipment; and actual progress of military reorganization.

m. Current political developments in Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia, and Sinkiang, with special reference to the U.S.S.R. and Chinese Communists.

n. Governmental regulations and policies affecting the reestablishment of American business and foreign trade.

o. Information on Hongkong regarding (1) nature of the new constitution and when it will come into effect; (2) British plans for development of the naval base and the strategic plan it is designed to implement; (3) actual (as against purely chauvinistic) position of the Chinese government regarding the return of Hongkong to China.

p. The whereabouts and employment of approximately 780,000 Japanese troops of the old Japanese Kwangtung Army formerly in Northern Manchuria.

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Appendix

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(SPECIAL LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

30 October 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS--CHINAMemorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

1. The proposed N.I.A. Directive enclosed herewith was prepared at the suggestion of representatives of the Intelligence Advisory Board at an Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff round table discussion. The appropriate representatives of the I.A.B. submitted their own agencies' suggestions for these requirements, collaborated in their synthesis, and unanimously approved this final draft, with which I fully concur.

2. C.I.G. proposes to prepare, as soon as practicable, similar National Intelligence Requirements on other areas, Korea and the Middle East having been agreed upon as the next areas to be covered.

3. It is recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board, acting for the National Intelligence Authority pursuant to Paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1:

a. Approve the attached proposed N.I.A. Directive, "National Intelligence Requirements--China".

b. Agree to limit distribution of this Directive, classified "TOP SECRET", to the C.I.G. and the intelligence agencies of the I.A.B. in Washington, to those theater or overseas area commanders selected by the War and Navy Departments, and to those chiefs of missions designated by the State Department.

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HOTT S. VANDENBERG
Lieutenant General, USA
Director of Central Intelligence

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D R A F T

PROPOSED N.I.A. DIRECTIVE

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS - CHINA

~~Approved by the Director of Central Intelligence
with the unanimous concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board
acting for the National Intelligence Authority Pursuant to
Paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1~~

INTRODUCTION

1. In order to fulfill the National Intelligence Mission as given to the National Intelligence Authority by the President, it is necessary to announce and maintain the essential elements of national intelligence desired, and a list of intelligence requirements from which those essential elements may be produced. These statements as a group will hereafter be known as "National Intelligence Requirements" and will form the broad basis for coordinated directives by all agencies for the production of intelligence.

2. It has been decided initially to evolve the operating procedures and the mechanics of inter-agency coordination necessary to the implementation of National Intelligence Requirements by publishing these requirements for one particular area, i.e., the China area, and basing their contents on that intelligence currently regarded the most essential. For this purpose, these instructions will obtain until circumstances demand their revision. In any event, they will be reviewed quarterly.

Accordingly, the National Intelligence Requirements - China are published herewith in two parts as follows:

Current
Part I - Essential Elements of National Intelligence

Part II - National Intelligence Requirements

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3. Upon publication of those National Intelligence Requirements, the Central Intelligence Group will immediately undertake to coordinate the various intelligence directives based thereon and will recommend, in three months from date of publication, any changes in this

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directive or in methods and procedures which have been evolved and which should be applied as standing operating procedures for implementing National Intelligence Requirements.

I. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

1. The Essential Elements of National Intelligence consist of that foreign intelligence which is currently essential to the national Government in making sound decisions, developing foreign policy, conducting foreign relations, avoiding surprise, and otherwise planning for and maintaining the national security.

2. The following Essential Elements of National Intelligence for the China area are announced and constitute a directive to the Central Intelligence Group and to the four intelligence agencies who will assist C.I.G. in producing national intelligence on that area.

3. What are the developments in the China area^{*} to show increased activity by the U.S.S.R. to:

- a. Split off territory from China?
- b. Support the Chinese Communist Party?
- c. Secure unilateral political or economic influence in China?
- d. Discredit U. S. Forces and aims in China?

4. What is the current Nationalist policy as it affects:

- a. Cessation of hostilities?
- b. Coalition?
- c. Foreign relations, particularly with U.S.S.R., U.S.?
- d. Economic and agrarian development?

* China (including Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang) and Outer Mongolia, and Korea.

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5. What are the capabilities and probable intentions of the Chinese Communist Party in political, economic and military spheres?

II. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

1. The following National Intelligence Requirements are announced as a guide to the intelligence pertaining to the China area which, when met, would fully satisfy the Essential Elements of National Intelligence. These requirements are to be regarded as the basis upon which all phases of intelligence production can be fully coordinated among the appropriate offices of C.I.A. and the intelligence agencies, and in order that all intelligence operations may be properly integrated to produce the desired essential elements.

2. The specific formulations in this section are designed to elicit intelligence which will aid in judging the success of, or threats to, U.S.-China policy in respect to the goals of Chinese peace, unity, democracy and rehabilitation, non-intervention, and foreign trade. Intelligence is desired on the following listed subjects, as individual items, analytic reports, etc., during the three months from date of issue:

a. Trends of policy of the National Government with respect to:

(1) Coalition, the Constitution, structure of government and locus of power, civil liberties, education and labor.

(2) Industrialization including the integration into China proper of Manchurian industry, state control and private enterprise, government finance, agrarian reform, foreign business in China, and Chinese foreign trade.

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c. Relations between the Chinese Communists and the U.S.S.R., with special emphasis on high-level liaison, or on signs of cleavage between the CCP and U.S.S.R. in policy towards the National Government, contiguous territories, the U.S., and domestic Chinese issues.

d. Soviet military strength and disposition in China, including Manchuria, and in North Korea, Mongolia and Soviet Siberia, including details of air, ground and naval forces; evidences of stockpiling; construction or improvement in air facilities and construction or improvement in all communications networks.

e. Soviet military aid to Chinese Communists with details, and evidences of any increase or decrease; information on traffic of military significance between Communist-controlled Shantung, Manchuria, and North Korea, or trans-Mongolian traffic.

f. Activities of Soviet agencies in Kuomintang and Communist China, and effectiveness of Soviet propaganda in China and classes which are influenced or reached by it.

g. Current political conditions in Manchuria, with special emphasis on the attitudes of the local peoples toward the Chinese Communists, National Government, other political groups, U.S.S.R., and U.S.A.

h. Strength, composition, organization and leadership of Chinese minority parties; attitude towards National Government, Communists, U.S.S.R., U.S.A.; freedom of function under National Government.

i. The development of Chinese industry, particularly iron and steel, shipping, electric power, textiles, petroleum, and light metals.

j. Crop conditions and food reserves in the areas controlled by the National Government and the Chinese Communists.

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
k. Communist military potential, in comparison with that of the National Government, including reserves, equipment, capabilities of both air and ground forces, and ability to provide logistic support.

l. Nationalist military potential, status and efficiency of air, ground and sea forces; ability of industry and arsenals to provide replacements of equipment; and actual progress of military reorganization.

m. Current political developments in Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia, and Sinkiang, with special reference to the U.S.S.R. and Chinese Communists.

n. Governmental regulations and policies affecting the reestablishment of American business and foreign trade.
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o. Information on Hongkong regarding (1) nature of the new constitution and when it will come into effect;
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p. The whereabouts and employment of approximately 780,000 Japanese troops of the old Japanese Kwangtung Army formerly in Northern Manchuria.

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30 October 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUPNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS--CHINAMemorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

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2. C.I.G. proposes to prepare, as soon as practicable, similar National Intelligence Requirements on other areas, Korea and the Middle East having been agreed upon as the next areas to be covered.
3. It is recommended that the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Board, acting for the National Intelligence Authority pursuant to Paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1:
 - a. Approve the attached proposed N.I.A. Directive, "National Intelligence Requirements--China".
 - b. Agree to limit distribution of this Directive, classified "TOP SECRET", to the C.I.G. and the intelligence agencies of the I.A.B. in Washington, to those theater or overseas area commanders selected by the War and Navy Departments, and to those chiefs of missions designated by the State Department.

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HOYT S. VANDENBERG
 Lieutenant General, USA
 Director of Central Intelligence

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D R A F T

PROPOSED N.I.A. DIRECTIVE

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS - CHINA

Approved by the Director of Central Intelligence
With the Unanimous Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board
Acting for the National Intelligence Authority Pursuant to
Paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1

INTRODUCTION

1. In order to fulfill the National Intelligence Mission as given to the National Intelligence Authority by the President, it is necessary to announce and maintain the essential elements of national intelligence desired, and a list of intelligence requirements from which those essential elements may be produced. These statements as a group will hereafter be known as "National Intelligence Requirements" and will form the broad basis [for coordinated directives by all agencies] for the production of intelligence.

2. It has been decided initially to evolve the operating procedures and the mechanics of inter-agency coordination necessary to the implementation of National Intelligence Requirements by publishing these requirements for one particular area, i.e., the China area, and basing their contents on that intelligence currently regarded the most essential. For this purpose, these instructions will obtain until circumstances demand their revision. In any event, they will be reviewed quarterly.

Accordingly, the National Intelligence Requirements - China are published herewith in two parts as follows:

Current Essentials of National Intelligence
Part I - Essential Elements of National Intelligence
OBJECTIVES
Part II - National Intelligence Requirements

3. Upon publication of those National Intelligence Requirements, the Central Intelligence Group will [immediately undertake to coordinate the various intelligence directives based thereon and will] recommend, in three months from date of publication, any changes in this

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directive or in methods and procedures which have been evolved and which should be applied as standing operating procedures for implementing National Intelligence Requirements.

*Current*I. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE*Current*

1. The Essential Elements of National Intelligence consist of that foreign intelligence which is currently essential to the national Government in making sound decisions, developing foreign policy, conducting foreign relations, avoiding surprise, and otherwise planning for and maintaining the national security.

Current

2. The following Essential Elements of National Intelligence for the China area are announced and constitute a directive to the Central Intelligence Group and to the four intelligence agencies who will assist C.I.G. in producing national intelligence on that area.

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* China (including Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang) and Outer Mongolia, and Korea.

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5. What are the capabilities and probable intentions of the Chinese Communist Party in political, economic and military spheres?

II. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

1. The following National Intelligence Requirements are announced as a guide to the intelligence pertaining to the China area which, when met, would fully satisfy the ^{Current} ~~Essentials~~ Elements of National Intelligence. These requirements are to be regarded as the basis upon which all phases of intelligence production can be fully coordinated among the appropriate offices of C.I.A. and the intelligence agencies, and in order that all intelligence operations may be properly integrated to produce the desired essential elements.

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j. Crop conditions and food reserves in the areas controlled by the National Government and the Chinese Communists.

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k. Communist military potential, in comparison with that of the National Government, including reserves, equipment, capabilities of both air and ground forces, and ability to provide logistic support.

l. Nationalist military potential, status and efficiency of air, ground and sea forces; ability of industry and arsenals to provide replacements of equipment; and actual progress of military reorganization.

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m. Current political developments in Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia, and Sinkiang, with special reference to the U.S.S.R. and Chinese Communists.

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n. Governmental regulations and policies affecting the reestablishment of American business and foreign trade.

o. Information on Hongkong regarding (1) nature of the new constitution and when it will come into effect;

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p. The whereabouts and employment of approximately 780,000 Japanese troops of the old Japanese Kwangtung Army formerly in Northern Manchuria.

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CONFIDENTIAL**E N C L O S U R E****D R A F T****PROPOSED N.I.A. DIRECTIVE****NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS - CHINA**

Approved by the Director of Central Intelligence
With the Unanimous Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board
Acting for the National Intelligence Authority Pursuant to
Paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1

INTRODUCTION

1. In order to fulfill the National Intelligence Mission as given to the National Intelligence Authority by the President, it is necessary to announce and maintain the ^{Current} ~~essentials~~ ~~elements~~ of national intelligence desired, and a list of intelligence requirements, objectives from which those essential elements may be produced. These statements as a group will hereafter be known as "National Intelligence Requirements" and will form the broad basis for ~~coordinated-directives-by-all-agencies-for~~ ^{Coordinated} the production of intelligence.

2. It has been decided initially to evolve the operating procedures and the mechanics of inter-agency coordination necessary to the production of intelligence based on a formulation implementation of National Intelligence Requirements by publishing these requirements for one particular area, i.e., the China area, and basing their contents on that intelligence currently regarded the most essential. For this purpose, ~~these-instructions~~ ^{their} ~~this-analysis~~ ^{will obtain until circumstances demand} ~~its revision.~~ ^{they} In any event, ~~it~~ ^{they} will be reviewed quarterly.

Accordingly, the National Intelligence Requirements - China are published herewith in two parts as follows:

^{Current}
Part I - Essential Elements of National Intelligence

Part II - National Intelligence Requirements Objectives

3. Open-publication-of-these-National-Intelligence-Requirements,

The Central Intelligence Group will immediately undertake to coordinate the collection of directives based on these requirements and will the various intelligence directives based thereon and will recommend

in three months from date of publication, any changes in this

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 In methods and procedures which should be applied as directive. operating procedures which have been evolved and which standing operating procedures for publication of National Intelligence Requirements.
 should be applied as standing operating procedures for implementing National Intelligence Requirements.

National Intelligence Requirements.

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I. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

1. The ~~Essential~~ ^{Current} Elements of National Intelligence consist of that foreign intelligence which is currently essential to the national Government in making sound decisions, developing foreign policy, conducting foreign relations, avoiding surprise, and otherwise planning for and maintaining the national security.

2. The following ~~Essential~~ ^{Current Essential} Elements of National Intelligence for the China area are announced and constitute a directive to the Central production of national intelligence on that subject. Intelligence Group and to the four intelligence agencies who will assist in producing national intelligence on that area.

3. What are the developments in the China area* to show increased activity by the U.S.S.R. to:

- a. Split off territory from China?
- b. Support the Chinese Communist Party?
- c. Secure unilateral political or economic influence in China?
- d. Discredit U.S. Forces and aims in China?

4. What is the current Nationalist policy as it affects:

- a. Cessation of hostilities?
- b. Coalition?
- c. Foreign relations, particularly with U.S.S.R., U.S.?
- d. Economic and agrarian development?

* China (including Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang) and Outer Mongolia, and Korea.

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5. What are the capabilities and probable intentions of the Chinese Communist Party in political, economic and military spheres?

II. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS OBJECTIVES

37 ✓

1. The following National Intelligence Objectives are announced as a guide to the production of intelligence pertaining to the China area which, when met, would fully satisfy the Essential Elements of National Intelligence. These requirements objectives are to be regarded as the basis upon which all phases of intelligence production can be fully coordinated among the appropriate offices of C.I.G. and the intelligence agencies.
 and-in-order-that-all-intelligence-operations-may-be-properly-integrated-to produce-the-desired-essential-elements.

2. The specific formulations in this section are designed to elicit intelligence which will aid in judging the success of, or threats to, U.S.-China policy in respect to the goals of Chinese peace, unity, democracy and rehabilitation, non-intervention, and foreign trade. Intelligence is desired on the following listed subjects: as-individual-items,-analytic-reports,-etc.,-during-the-three-months-from-date
 ef-issue-

a. Trends of policy of the National Government with respect to:

(1) Coalition, the Constitution, structure of government and locus of power, civil liberties, education and labor.
 (2) Industrialization including the integration into China proper of Manchurian industry, state control and private enterprise, government finance, agrarian reform, foreign business in China, and Chinese foreign trade.

b. Trends in policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with respect to terms for participation in coalition government, reorganization of their armies and control by the National Government, relinquishment to a coalition government of centralized controls over the administration of Communist-dominated areas.

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c. Relations between the Chinese Communists and the U.S.S.R., with special emphasis on high-level liaison, or on signs of cleavage between the CCP and U.S.S.R. in policy towards the National Government, contiguous territories, the U.S., and domestic Chinese issues.

d. Soviet military strength and disposition in China, including Manchuria, and in North Korea, Mongolia and Soviet Siberia, including details of air, ground and naval forces; evidences of stockpiling; construction or improvement in air facilities and construction or improvement in all communications networks.

e. Soviet military aid to Chinese Communists with details, and evidences of any increase or decrease; information on traffic of military significance between Communist-controlled Shantung, Manchuria, and North Korea, or trans-Mongolian traffic.

f. Activities of Soviet agencies in Kuomintang and Communist China, and effectiveness of Soviet propaganda in China and classes which have influenced or reached by it.

g. Current political conditions in Manchuria, with special emphasis on the attitudes of the local peoples toward the Chinese Communists, National Government, other political groups, U.S.S.R., and U.S.A.

h. Strength, composition, organization and leadership of Chinese minority parties; attitude towards National Government, Communists, U.S.S.R., U.S.A.; freedom of function under National Government.

i. The development of Chinese industry, particularly iron and steel, shipping, electric power, textiles, petroleum, and light metals.

j. Crop conditions and food reserves in the areas controlled by the National Government and the Chinese Communists.

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k. Communist military potential, in comparison with that of the National Government, including reserves, equipment, capabilities of both air and ground forces, and ability to provide logistic support.

l. Nationalist military potential, status and efficiency of air, ground and sea forces; ability of industry and arsenals to provide replacements of equipment; and actual progress of military reorganization.

m. Current political developments in Inner Mongolia, Outer Mongolia, and Sinkiang, with special reference to the U.S.S.R. and Chinese Communists.

n. Governmental regulations and policies affecting the re-establishment of American business and foreign trade.

o. Information on Hongkong regarding (1) nature of the new constitution and when it will come into effect;

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[REDACTED]

p. The whereabouts and employment of approximately 780,000 Japanese troops of the old Japanese Kwangtung Army formerly in Northern Manchuria.

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To [REDACTED]

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5 NOV 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. EDDY
 GENERAL CHAMBERLIN
 ADMIRAL INGLIS
 GENERAL MACDONALD

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Subject: National Intelligence Requirements.

Reference: CIG [REDACTED] 30 October 1946.

1. At the 27 August 1946 meeting of Deputies of permanent IAI members it was agreed that National Intelligence Requirements should be developed and that coordinated collection procedures to meet these national intelligence requirements area by area should follow.

2. The first of these NIR has been completed by the CIO, with the assistance and concurrence of research members of the IAS agencies, reference above. Although these NIR-China have not yet been formally accepted by the NIA, it is requested that you designate a representative for an interdepartmental meeting at 1130 8 November 1946, Room 2178, New War Department Building, to draw up a coordinated collection program for the implementation of the NIR-China.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

"SIGNED"

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JAMES S. LAY, JR.
 Secretary, N.I.A.

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 1. Reply form.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS--CHINA
[REDACTED]

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We are most anxious to publish NIR-China [REDACTED], which you concurred in at the 10th meeting of the I.A.B. on November 7th. In accordance with your recommendation at that time we have not published this paper pending your informal clearance of the implementing directive. This implementing directive was prepared by your collection representatives who reached a full accord on November 22 on the divisions of the collection tasks incident thereto. Each representative was to obtain your clearance and notify us, but to date we have only received clearance from State.

We are most anxious to expedite this matter. The subject was first suggested by your deputies at a meeting on August 30. As I mentioned, it was approved by you on November 7 and the implementation has been in your agencies since November 25. As soon as we can publish this paper, we will be able to undertake NIR on other important areas. As you realize, the enunciation of these requirements is particularly important to a directed effort of OSO, as well as the agencies.

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BRIEF ON [REDACTED]

The first item on the agenda, which was postponed from the last meeting, is a proposed directive setting forth the national intelligence requirements for China. This was suggested and has been approved by your representatives who work with ICAPS. Because of the importance of this directive, it is suggested that we act for the N.I.A., as authorized by N.I.A. Directive No. 1, in issuing these requirements as an N.I.A. directive.

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BRIEF ON [REDACTED]

The final item on the agenda is a proposed directive establishing the national intelligence requirements for China. This also has been approved by your representatives who worked with ICAPS. In fact, the development of this directive was suggested by your representatives, who felt that, before attempting to establish these requirements on a global basis, a single country -- namely, China -- should be used as something of a test case. Because of the importance of this directive to the national intelligence program, it is suggested that we act for the NIA, as authorized by NIA Directive No. 1, in publishing these requirements as an NIA directive.

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Are there any comments on [REDACTED]

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26 January 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HEDY
ADMIRAL INGLIS
GENERAL MCDONALD

Subject: National Intelligence Requirements - China

There is enclosed herewith for your information a copy of a memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence to General Chamberlin, subject as above, dated 23 January 1947.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

E. K. WRIGHT
Colonel, G.S.C.
Deputy Director

Enclosure (1)

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Executive Registry (1)
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January 23, 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL CHAMBERLIN:

Subject: National Intelligence Requirements - China

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1. Reference your memorandum of 8 January 1947, subject, [REDACTED] which reads:

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"1. Approval of [REDACTED] was originally given subject to the approval of the collection plan drawn up for its implementation.

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"2. [REDACTED] and its accompanying plan for collection were accepted as an experiment in the coordination of the collection of intelligence--China being selected as the field for the experiment. This action was taken with the hope that it might lead to a solution of the fundamental problems of the coordination of all collection activities and the delineation of intelligence responsibilities, although it was recognized that it and its counterpart, the CIG plan, was more limited in scope than, and somewhat contrary to, War Department doctrines which are global in nature.

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"3. [REDACTED] was initiated, NIA Directive No. 7 has been published, coordinating the entire field of collection activities. [REDACTED] too, (which coordinates the responsibilities for the production of intelligence) is now in circulation and apparently its approval is in sight. When approved, [REDACTED], together with NIA Directive No. 7, would appear to obviate the desirability of the China experiment.

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"4. In view of the publication of NIA Directive No. 7 and the impending publication of the Enclosure to [REDACTED] it is recommended that [REDACTED] and its accompanying collection plan be withdrawn from the consideration of the Intelligence Advisory Board or at least postponed for consideration to insure that it be brought into full consonance with the broader directives."

2. Your proposal that CIG discontinue the preparation of National Intelligence Requirements indicates a misunderstanding of the national intelligence program as it is being developed by CIG with the advice and assistance of representatives of the IAB agencies. I, therefore, believe it advisable to explain this program in some detail so that



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you may see the part to be played by the National Intelligence Requirements, their absolute necessity to the Director of Central Intelligence in the performance of his mission, and their expected usefulness to the several agencies.

3. In its efforts to comply with the mission assigned to it by the President's letter of 22 January 1946 as interpreted in part by subsequent NIA Directives, the CIG, under my direction, has undertaken to develop plans "to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security," and "to furnish strategic and national policy intelligence to the President and the State, War, and Navy Departments, etc." These plans have fallen under the three general heads of: (a) collection; (b) research or production; (c) dissemination. Those several specific problems which have been referred by the agencies to CIG for coordination have also been studied in the light of these three basic categories.

4. These three basic plans are designed to facilitate the implementation of the collection, research, and dissemination of: (a) departmental intelligence; and (b) strategic or national policy intelligence. By the President's letter, departmental intelligence continues to be the responsibility of the departments. It has such subdivisions as tactical intelligence, combat intelligence, operational intelligence, and staff intelligence. Strategic and national policy intelligence is allocated by the President to the Director of Central Intelligence. It is composed of such parts as daily digests of current intelligence, situation reports, special evaluations, and basic intelligence. Overall it is that intelligence which results from an expert correlation, evaluation, and analysis of all available intelligence information, including departmental intelligence, for the use of the President and top policy officers of the Government in developing policies for the protection of the national security. CIG's interests in this national strategic intelligence is paramount since the Director of Central Intelligence alone is authorized to produce it. He must, therefore, determine its collection requirements and procedures, research requirements and procedures, and dissemination requirements and procedures. To this end "all necessary facilities, intelligence and information in the possession of the respective departments" is by NIA Directive No. 1 made available to the DCI.

5. In developing its plans for the coordination of the three basic phases of intelligence work, CIG has attempted and sincerely believes that it has given careful consideration to the requirements of the several agencies as well as to its own requirements. Every effort has been made to create an appreciation by the agencies of their interdependability and the logic of closer cooperation.

6. One of the forces behind the original creation of the central intelligence organization was the lack of some central point where the intelligence of the four agencies could be correlated objectively, free from departmental pressures, and evaluated as a whole.

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7. A collection plan can provide for the coordination of all collection activities and procedures whether they are for the collection of material for departmental or national strategic intelligence. But to be a continuing plan not requiring frequent change it can not contain directives as to what intelligence material is most desired during any given period. The requirements of today are not the requirements of tomorrow. At most it can allocate broad fields to specialized collectors. Even here provision must be made for ad hoc reallocation on special occasions. The mass of intelligence material available to efficient collectors is such that selection must be made. That selection can be made only by those having the perspective of distance and a knowledge of the policy or operational officers' demand for estimates. No basic plan for collection coordination meets this requirement. Only some specific program such as the NIR providing periodic guidance, which can be implemented by the collection coordination plan, will do this. By consultation with the agencies the NIR will insofar as possible include in order of their relative importance the intelligence requirements of the several agencies and of CIG. The National Intelligence Requirements will also serve as guidance for the general activities of Special Operations. Their absence will leave the coordinators designated by NIA Directive No. 7 without the guidance they must have for the implementation of that plan. Because of the above and because of my responsibility to produce national strategic intelligence, I believe in the necessity of the prompt issuance of the National Intelligence Requirements for the strategic areas of the world and must take such steps as appear appropriate to that end. It is my understanding that other intelligence agencies represented in IAB concur in this opinion.

8. The production plan is a natural companion of the collection plan. Without that coordination which establishes sound and sure agency interdependability, each agency must operate as a self-contained unit performing by and for itself all the collection and production procedures. Allocation in one field requires concurrent allocation in the other. It can not be expected that the intelligence requirements of the several agencies for their own departmental intelligence will produce the intelligence necessary for the production of national strategic intelligence. Conversely, there is no intention that the NIR will restrict the reporting by agency representatives abroad in fulfillment of their parent agency's requests for intelligence of current value to departmental intelligence. Nor will the NIR replace the standing instructions providing for the steady flow of factual data destined for the compilation or revision of basic or static intelligence. The NIR are intended only to give guidance as to what emphasis should be placed within the vast field. They have to serve as a current periodic program for the implementation of the basic long-range plan. This does not preclude the procedure whereby basic estimates will be further treated by any or all of the agencies in the preparation of their departmental intelligence. But the mere possession of intelligence in no matter what form is not an end in itself. There must, therefore, be a dissemination procedure.

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9. The dissemination plan must insure the rapid dissemination of all incoming intelligence information to those agencies that may require it in that form. It should equally discontinue the dissemination of intelligence material which is not wanted and which only confuses by its oppressive volume. In addition, it should insure the dissemination of basic estimates required for the development of departmental intelligence. And finally, it should insure the receipt by CIG of all departmental intelligence studies and estimates so that proper strategic and national policy intelligence may be prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence for the President.

10. I, therefore, request that you issue such directives as may be necessary to the individuals already designated by you to assist the CIG in preparing NIR for the USSR and the Middle East. Invitations for interagency meetings to prepare these NIR will be issued in the next few days.

11. I also request that you give your concurrence to the immediate issuance of NIR China. As you are aware, the preparation of NIR China was initiated on 30 August 1946 with the idea they would be revised quarterly. The NIR China was approved by the LAB on 7 November 1946 and the subsequent delay has been the result of consideration of the implementing directive. Although I believe the detailed implementing directives for the NIR will, when the plan is eventually perfected, insure the most efficient intelligence production, I am withdrawing the implementing directive to NIR China and shall refer the problem of their implementation to CIG Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination who will issue such collection requests as may appear necessary.

/s/ HOYT S. VANDENBERG
Lieutenant General, USA
Director of Central Intelligence

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